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Commentary
Robert J. Tetlow
a number of other, large macroeconomic forecast
teams around the world use broadly similar tools.
To the extent this is true, this critique is germane
to a broader set of model builders and users.
After I provide some background, my com-
ments get more specific. I argue that issues of
econometric identification limit the confidence
with which we can approach the CBO estimates;
I argue against the widespread use of deterministic
time trends, particularly in the real-time context;
and I question the uncritical application of Okun’s
law.
WHITHER POTENTIAL?
Who needs potential output measures and for
what reason? One way of illustrating this question
from the perspective of a policymaker is to refer
to a simple forecast-based Taylor rule, like the
one shown below:
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obert Arnold (2009) clearly and com-
pletely lays out the approach used
by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) for measuring potential output
and discusses the limitations therein. 
In this commentary, I revisit arguments made
by the authors and discussants of a paper on this
same subject at a 1978 Carnegie-Rochester con-
ference to show how little the CBO methodology
differs from methods used 30 years ago and con-
jecture on why this is so. From there I speculate
on why current methods have been impervious to
the critiques from 30 years ago and econometric
developments in the years thereafter.
The measurement of potential output clearly
matters, and matters even more in real time, at
least for some decisionmakers. The growth rate of
potential pins down the tax base for fiscal author-
ities and lawmakers; it provides a baseline for
GDP growth for economic forecasters; and it helps
establish a benchmark for policymakers and finan-
cial market participants to interpret the real-time
data.1 The level of potential defines the point to
which the economy is expected to gravitate over
the medium term and so is important for monetary
authorities, forecasters, and anyone who needs
to interpret business cycles. I review why and for
whom it matters and critique the methods used
by the CBO. The CBO methodology is not unique
to that institution; rather, it is my impression that
1 An example of the latter is the recent decline in labor force partici-
pation. Until a few years ago, sustainable employment growth from
the establishment survey was estimated at around 120,000 and
levels below that would have been interpreted as foreshadowing
possible easing in monetary policy and increases in bond prices.
The work of Aaronson et al. (2006) showed that sustainable addi-
tions to employment are probably much lower now than before.
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the real funds rate, ˀ is inflation, y is (the natural
logarithm of) real gross domestic product (GDP),
and u is a stochastic term. The asterisks on the
real rate and on output represent “potential”
(or “natural”) levels; these natural levels are not
observable. The coefficients, ˆj, j = y, and ˀ, would
normally be expected to be positive. The partial
derivatives above the equation itself show how
changes in potential output affect the rule and
hence decisionmaking. Starting with the term far-
thest to the right, an increase in the level of poten-
tial—that is, ∂y* > 0—decreases estimates of the
output gap, y – y*, all else equal. Higher potential
would also reduce expected future inflation—
Etˀt+1—because smaller gaps usually mean less
inflation and both of these would be expected to
lead to a lower federal funds rate. An increase in
the growth rate of potential—∂￿∆y*￿ > 0—raises
the equilibrium real interest rate, which would
call for an increase in the funds rate, all else equal,
but it would also have complex, model-dependent
effects on current and future output gaps and
inflation.2
What complicates this is that the only observ-
ables in the equation are current output, which
is subject to revision, and the federal funds rate
itself. A policymaker—in this instance, the Fed—
is obliged to add structure to this underidentified
equation through the use of a macroeconomic
model of some sort. For their part, interpreters
of the data—Fed watchers, among others—are
obliged to “invert” the (perceived) policy rule
and infer what the Fed’s estimates of rr*, ∆y*, y*,
and Etˀt+1 might be.3 The only inevitability is
that all parties will get it wrong; the question is
in what way and how critically.4
METHODOLOGY: A DÉJÀ VU
EXPERIENCE
Bob Arnold’s paper does a solid job of explain-
ing the CBO’s methodology for measuring and
projecting potential output. He also shows sub-
stantial awareness of the limitations of their
approach; there is little for me to add on that
score. To provide a different perspective, in this
section I offer readers a “blast from the past,”
from 30 years ago, in fact. I describe the approach
of Perloff and Wachter (1979) from a Carnegie-
Rochester conference in 1978. Like Arnold,
Perloff and Wachter start with an estimate of the
non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment
(NAIRU) from a previous paper; then, they esti-
mate potential labor input as follows:
(2)  
where t
k, k = 1,2,3 are polynomial time trends, u
is the unemployment rate, c is a constant, and ʵ
is a residual. Potential labor input, n*, is evalu-
ated using this equation by setting cyclical and
noise terms to zero; in this instance, u = u* and
ʵ = 0 for all t. Perloff and Wachter follow the same
procedure with potential capital input, except that
the equation in this case is a “cyclically sensitive
translog production function” (p. 122) augmented
with more polynomial time trends. The similarity
to Arnold’s equation (1) is remarkable.5
With this sameness in mind, I can make my
job as discussant easier by shamelessly stealing
from Perloff and Wachter’s discussants. Gordon
(1979) focused on estimation:
[W]ithout making any statistically significant
difference in the wage equation, one could
come up with an estimated increase in u*
between 1956 and 1974 ranging anywhere
from 0.58 to 1.61 percentage points… (p. 190)
In other words, taking u* as exogenous, rather
than estimating a complete system, particularly
while ignoring the imprecision of the first-stage
log , n c u u t t t t ( ) = + − ( )+ + + +
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2 I am thinking of a closed economy here, or at least one that, if open,
is not “small.”
3 Of course, what Fed watchers might also want to infer from policy
decisions given a policy rule is an estimate of the target rate of
inflation. The target rate has been normalized out of our policy
rule, for simplicity.
4 It makes a difference whether it is the Fed that is “getting it wrong”
or the private sector. The more the Fed gets things wrong, the harder
it is for the private sector to infer something about the economy
from Fed behavior. This is, of course, one of the reasons behind
arguments for transparency in monetary policy.
5 From a real-time perspective, the CBO’s methodology could be
more problematic than Perloff and Wachter’s in that the CBO uses
trends dated back from the previous business cycle peak. No doubt
this is to avoid the political heat that might come from making a
call on a potentially contentious issue in real time. By definition,
this method will miss turning points, possibly by wide margins.estimates, is problematic. Elsewhere, Gordon
remarks on overparameterization:
Taking this set of data for u*, one can compute
an acceptable and consistent natural output
series without any use of production functions
at all. (p. 188)
That is, because the time-trend variables are
doing the bulk of the work, it is not clear that
there is anything unambiguously “supply side”
in the calculation. The other discussants, Plosser
and Schwert (1979), focused on interpretation of
the results and the related issue of econometric
identification:
[A]ggregate demand policies are not necessar-
ily appropriate in a world where actual output
is viewed as the outcome of aggregate supply
and demand...In such an equilibrium world,
“potential output” ceases to have any signifi-
cance. (p. 184)
Thus, even though the real business cycle
literature had yet to emerge, the seeds of the idea
were clearly already planted.
Both commentaries remark, in their own way,
on econometric identification. How does one
differentiate between supply (or potential) and
demand (the gap)? Does it even make sense to try?
The use of time trends, which are both determin-
istic and smooth, is an identifying assumption
made by both Perloff and Wachter (1979) and
Arnold (2009). Their use implies that supply
shocks have not happened often historically and
can be safely ignored in real time for forecast pur-
poses. When Perloff and Wachter were writing,
the literature on unit roots in real GDP—which
would come to include, as it happens, an impor-
tant contribution by Nelson and Plosser (1982)—
had not yet arisen. But this is not so for the CBO
or any of a variety of other institutions that use
similar approaches.6 Why, then, has the method-
ology on measuring potential output apparently
not absorbed anything from the literature on unit
roots and stochastic trends over the past 30 years?
My conjecture is threefold. First, the CBO—
like most macroeconomic policy institutions—
maintains a distinctly Keynesian perspective on
how the economy works, a view that maintains
that the majority of fluctuations in real GDP come
from demand disturbances and that policy plays
a key role in smoothing those fluctuations. This
approach is natural enough; policy institutions do
tend to draw individuals who believe that policy
is highly consequential. And to paraphrase the
old line: When one likes to use hammers, the
object of interest tends to look like a nail. My
second conjecture is more subtle. Economists at
institutions like the CBO must be able to answer
a wide variety of questions from decisionmakers
and they need a structure that allows them to do
so in short order. The complex, deterministic
accounting structure that Arnold describes allows
the CBO to do that, although one could of course
quarrel with the efficacy of the advice that comes
from such a structure. Third, while I would argue
that the literature on unit roots shows that perma-
nent shocks to GDP—shocks that can fairly be
characterized as supply shocks—are important,
that literature has not yet provided high-precision
tools for measuring those shocks in real time. The
standard errors of estimates of potential output
and the output gap are large.7 And the problem
gets worse as the parameter space of the model
grows.
Nonetheless, I would argue that even though
adopting the stochastic approach involves tack-
ling some difficult issues, it is still a step worth
taking. These same issues exist with the extant
method, but they have been swept under the rug
through the identification by assumption implicit
in the use of time trends to represent aggregate
supply. We are dealing with unobserved variables
here; it only makes sense that, with the passage
of time, our backcasts of potential output would
differ significantly from our nowcasts. To “assume
away” the stochastic properties of the data only
Tetlow
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6 Barnett, Kozicki, and Petrinec (2009) note that the Bank of Canada
has used a stochastic method for measuring potential since 1992.
The Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/U.S. model forecast uses a stochas-
tic state-space method. The Fed’s official Greenbook forecast—being
judgmental—is more complicated. The Board staff consult a variety
of models for guidance on adjusting potential output and its con-
stituent parts, but they do so on an ad hoc basis. There is, however, a
significant smoothness prior on trend labor productivity, and hence
on potential output, and a prior that Okun’s law holds fairly strongly.
7 The discussion slides show an example of the bootstrapped standard
errors from a simple unobserved components model of potential
output. These are available at the online version of this Review
article.ignores the issue; it doesn’t solve it. A more clear-
eyed view, in my opinion, is to accept the stochas-
tic nature of potential and adjust procedures and
interpretations to this reality by being prepared
to adapt estimates rapidly and efficiently in real
time (see, e.g., Laxton and Tetlow, 1992).
OKUN’S LAW
I have already noted the strong Keynesian
prior implicit in the methods for measuring poten-
tial output at the CBO and other policy institu-
tions. As noted, this prior is evident in the use of
deterministic time trends. It is also a function of
the fact that potential output—and hence output
gaps—are constructed beginning with estimates
of the NAIRU, and hence the unemployment gap,
using Okun’s law. This is illustrated in Arnold’s
Figure 1, which shows the CBO output gap and
the unemployment gap on the same chart. The
chart provides an “ocular regression” of Okun’s
law: The two lines are nearly on top of one another,
meaning that a linear, static relationship between
the two concepts fits the (constructed) data very
well. In essence, this means that the output gap
and the unemployment gap are nearly the same.
The view that the unemployment gap and
output gap are isomorphic—that is, the view that
Okun’s law really is something that approaches a
“law”—has important implications for the charac-
terization of business cycles. The following log-
linearized Cobb-Douglas production function
shows this:
(3)                     
where a is total factor productivity, and we meas-
ure potential output using full-employment labor
input, n*, and the actual capital stock, k, as is
usually the case:
(4)                   
and then subtract equation (4) from equation (3)
to show the relationship between output gaps,
y – y*, and the labor market gap, n – n*8:
(5)               
y n k = + + − ( ) a θ θ 1 ,
y n k
∗ ∗ ∗ = + + − ( ) a θ θ 1 ,
y y n n − = − ( )+ − ( )
∗ ∗ ∗ a a θ .
Now Arnold’s Figure 1 implies that y – y* –
ʸ￿n – n*￿ is small and unimportant—taken to the
limit, Okun’s law implies that it should be white
noise. This, in turn, means that what we might call
the productivity gap, a – a*, must also be small
and unimportant. Should it be? Should anyone
care? What is the productivity gap anyway? The
productivity gap can represent any or all of a vari-
able workweek of capital, variable capacity utiliza-
tion, or labor adjustment costs to productivity
shocks.9 Loosely speaking, fluctuations in a that
are not in response to shocks to a* are labor adjust-
ment shocks, whereas shocks to a*, all else equal,
are classic productivity shocks. The productivity
gap, ￿a – a*￿, can be unimportant only in the
unlikely circumstance that actual productivity,
a, moves instantaneously with a productivity
shock, a*, and disturbances to a, holding a* con-
stant, are themselves close to white noise. In short,
the only way the productivity gap could be small
and unimportant—and, therefore, the only way
that Okun’s law can hold so tightly as to be called
a law—is either because aggregate demand moves
instantaneously with productivity or if there are
no productivity shocks in the first place. Neither
of these possibilities seems plausible.
My own preference would be to drop the
deterministic time trends, relaxing somewhat
the iron grip of Okun’s law, and treat potential
output as a stochastic variable. Doing so would
allow for meaningful supply-side shocks, mod-
eled using state-space techniques, probably with
the Kalman filter.10 From an operational point of
view, this shifts the prior on the incidence of
shocks somewhat. Under the deterministic prior,
all real surprises are demand shocks and this view
Tetlow
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8 I am blurring the distinction between the unemployment gap and
the labor market gap—the difference being what might be called
the average workweek gap and the labor force participation rate
gap. This distinction is important to my point only if one thinks
that all productivity adjustment—a movements relative to a*—is
carried out on these two margins, which seems unlikely.
9 Whether there is any meaningful distinction among these three
stories depends on the underlying model.
10 My suggestions here are particularly relevant for a decisionmaking
body when the level of the gap is important. I think this is true for
almost all policy institutions but is undoubtedly “more true” for,
say, a central bank, than for a fiscal authority.is adjusted only rarely and after the fact; with the
stochastic view, the default option becomes one
wherein some portion of a given output surprise
is characterized as a supply shock. The model
user could override that prior, but it would be a
conscious decision on the user’s part to do so.
In this way, the stochastic approach would be
responsive in real time, allowing estimates to
adapt to developments such as the productivity
boom of the late 1990s in a way that the determin-
istic approach would not. Such a property is an
important one, particularly for institutions whose
policy instruments may be adjusted with rela-
tively high frequency. State-space models also
allow the modeling of nonlinearities—for exam-
ple, to capture different dynamics when cycles
are being driven largely by supply shocks rather
than by demand shocks or to allow for “jobless
recoveries”—although the econometric hurdles
are correspondingly higher.11
Such an approach comes at some cost, how-
ever, because either the parameter space must be
small or the user must be willing to impose priors
on enough parameters to give the estimator a
chance of producing reasonable results. Still, this
approach would likely impose fewer restrictions
than the current approach. At a minimum, weak-
ening the prior that all shocks are demand shocks
opens the door for model users to consider what
kind of shocks might have produced the cross sec-
tion of measured surprises—positive for output
and negative for inflation, for example—in real
time. This, in turn, would allow a more rapid
adjustment to new information and smaller and
less persistent forecast and policy errors than
would otherwise be the case.
CONCLUSION
Bob Arnold has outlined a detailed and
sophisticated approach to measuring potential
output as used by the CBO. In my opinion, the
approach is representative of the perspective and
needs of a range of policy institutions. In general
terms, the remarkable thing about the CBO
method, and methods like it, is how little it differs
from methods used 30 years ago. This lack of pen-
etration of academic ideas into the policymaking
sphere is perplexing in some ways. However, it
reflects, in part, the needs of institutions to be able
to answer myriad questions using the same model.
This practice tends to result in the construction of
large, elaborate models, and unfortunately not all
modern econometric techniques scale up well to
large models. The good news is that new methods
in Bayesian econometrics offer considerable help
in estimating larger systems while paying proper
heed to the priors of the model builders and users.
Another source of the lack of progress, in my view,
is the strong Keynesian prior regarding the sources
of business cycle fluctuations. Many public policy
institutions regard supply shocks as rare enough
to be ignored. I would argue that this prior is
overly strong—we know for a fact it was dead
wrong in the United States in the late 1990s (see,
e.g., Anderson and Kliesen, 2005; and Tetlow and
Ironside, 2007). It might also be deleterious for
policymaking because the perspective that all
shocks are demand shocks leads directly to the
view that all fluctuations should be smoothed out,
which is arguably a recipe for “fine-tuning.”
We are now in a period in which the CBO
methodology is being tested. By construction,
the CBO will have concluded that the current
“financial stress shock” to the U.S. economy is
entirely a demand-side phenomenon with large
implications for the output gap and eventually for
inflation. This is a contestable position. It would
not be hard to fashion an argument that the desired
capital stock, and hence the level of potential
output, has shifted down; interpreting the shock
in this less devoutly Keynesian way would mean
smaller output gaps, less disinflationary pressure,
and somewhat less need for expansionary policy,
all else equal. We shall see. In any case, quite
apart from the methods detailed therein, Bob
Arnold’s paper shows a mindful understanding
of the uncertainties involved, which is probably
more important. It thereby serves the Congress
well.
Tetlow
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11 Bayesian methods can be helpful in this regard, particularly for
policy institutions that tend to be unapologetic about having prior
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